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Somalia is facing a serious risk that al Shabaab could move into Mogadishu and turn the country into a jihadist-ruled state, according to a new analysis by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. The report, written by researcher Matt Bryden, warns that the federal government is losing control outside the capital while the African Union mission is running out of funds and political leaders are becoming increasingly divided. Together, these problems are creating conditions that make once-unthinkable scenarios—such as the fall of Mogadishu—more realistic.
The brief says al Shabaab currently controls about 30 percent of Somalia and has advanced to within roughly 50 kilometers of Mogadishu after launching a major offensive in central Somalia in April 2025. Diplomatic staff reportedly reduced their presence in the city as militants set up checkpoints along key roads. Although the group paused to strengthen its positions in Middle Shabelle, the report says their progress shows how close they are to threatening the capital again.
One of the biggest concerns highlighted is the weakness of Somalia’s national army. The report describes the government as mostly confined to Mogadishu and a few nearby towns, relying heavily on international support to survive. A major offensive launched in 2023 initially showed promise but later collapsed, allowing al Shabaab to retake most of the territory the government had reclaimed in Galmudug and Hirshabelle. The militants have since strengthened their presence along the northern route into Mogadishu—the same direction they used in 2010 when they nearly captured the city.
In October 2025, an al Shabaab unit attacked the headquarters of the National Intelligence and Security Agency in Mogadishu, freeing prisoners and destroying files less than one kilometer from Villa Somalia. The report says this attack demonstrated how vulnerable the capital has become. Somalia’s defense chief later told Parliament that between 10,000 and 15,000 soldiers have been killed or injured in the past three years. This toll has left the army exhausted, divided, and increasingly reliant on special forces to operate outside the city.
The African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia faces its own problems. The report says the AU mission has received only a fraction of the funding it needs for 2025, and it is already carrying major unpaid bills from 2024. Without new money, AU troops may soon be forced to limit their responsibilities to protecting the port, airport, and diplomatic zone, leaving the rest of Mogadishu even more exposed.
On the political front, the study argues that Somalia’s federal system is breaking down. The 2012 Constitution created a structure that was supposed to share power between Mogadishu and federal member states such as Puntland, Jubaland, Galmudug, Hirshabelle and Southwest. But the report says successive governments have centralized power instead of sharing it. Tensions have peaked under the current administration, with disputes over constitutional changes, regional boundaries and the electoral system ahead of 2026.
As a result, Puntland and Jubaland have withdrawn cooperation with Mogadishu and warned that any attempt to extend the president’s term beyond May 2026 would be unacceptable. Opposition groups in Mogadishu have raised similar concerns. The report warns that this political division leaves Somalia unable to form a united front against al Shabaab.
The report also notes that the growing influence of different Islamist networks—both violent and non-violent—has shaped Somalia’s political landscape. While al Shabaab uses violence to pursue an Islamic state, non-violent Salafi networks have gained major influence in politics, business, and religious institutions. Some recent constitutional amendments shaped by religious scholars have raised concerns among human rights groups.
Regional power rivalries further complicate the situation. Türkiye and Qatar support actors in Mogadishu, while the UAE, Ethiopia and Kenya hold closer ties with Puntland, Jubaland, and Somaliland. Somaliland’s long-standing push for international recognition may also gain new attention if southern Somalia becomes more unstable.
The report outlines two possible futures. One path is for Somalia’s leaders to quickly rebuild political cooperation. This would require forming a government of national unity, returning to the original constitutional framework, and agreeing on an indirect federal election in 2026. Security reforms would need to be revived, giving federal member state forces and local militias a leading role, with the national army and AU mission offering support.
The second path is far more dangerous: a collapse in which al Shabaab captures Mogadishu and gains control of the country’s main port revenues. In that case, regions like Puntland, Jubaland and Hiiraan could form a temporary federal authority elsewhere, backed by regional partners, and attempt to govern the areas outside al Shabaab’s reach.
The brief concludes that Somalia’s future will be shaped not only by military battles but by political decisions. Leaders must either repair the federal system and collaborate, or risk seeing Mogadishu fall after decades of conflict.